Friday, February 20, 2015

BENITO ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 154130-August 20, 2004

FACTS
On September 1, 1997, private offended parties together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioner’s house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Arbitrary Detention

Held: Petitioner Benito Astorga is acquitted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt.

The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. After a careful review of the evidence on record, the court find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended parties. The court fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their mission. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat.

Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure, capable to two interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private offended parties were taken to petitioner’s house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is equally plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and drinks to the team at his house. He could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains and ate together with the private offended parties and even laughed with them while conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile confrontation between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.

As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man than to convict an innocent man. 

Saturday, November 22, 2014

Azcueta v. CA G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009



FACTS:

Petitioner Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. Less than two months after their first meeting, they got married on July 24, 1993. At the time of their marriage, petitioner was 23 years old while respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage and bore no child.

On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of a husband.

Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked his mother for financial assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who paid the monthly rental.
Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her husband to find employment. She even bought him a newspaper every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most jobs have an age limit and that he had no clothes to wear to job interviews. Sometime later, her husband told petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner was overjoyed. However, some weeks after, petitioner was informed that her husband had been seen at the house of his parents when he was supposed to be at work. Petitioner discovered that her husband didn’t actually get a job and the money he gave her came from his mother. 

Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically violent towards her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only had sex once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it. When they discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was sacred and it should not be enjoyed nor abused. He did not even want to have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready. Additionally, when petitioner requested that they move to another place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents, Rodolfo did not agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow her. But he did not.

During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfo’s first cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a witness. In 1993, Ramos, the niece of Rodolfo’s father, was living with Rodolfo’s family. She corroborated petitioner’s testimony that Rodolfo was indeed not gainfully employed when he married petitioner and he merely relied on the allowance given by his mother. She learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner that he has a job but in truth he had none.

Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas said that based on the information gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.

HELD:
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her husband.

In Marcos v. Marcos, it was held that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.

It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the psychologist, petitioner testified in court on the facts upon which the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. 

Second, the root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the petition, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision.

The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and, despite pleas from petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find employment; that from the choice of the family abode to the couple’s daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that the couple’s inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfo’s refusal to have a child stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his relationship to his mother.

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondent’s emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his own decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply with his marital obligations. Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the account of respondent’s severe and incurable psychological incapacity.

Third, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. Contrary to the CA’s finding that the parties lived harmoniously and independently in the first few years of marriage, witnesses were united in testifying that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To be sure, these manifestations of Rodolfo’s dependent personality disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development and a by product of his upbringing and family life.

Fourth, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The Court is wary of the CA’s bases for overturning factual findings of the trial court on this point. The CA’s reasoning that Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to his embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was his "responsible" realization that he should not have a child since he is unemployed are all purely speculative. There is no evidence on record to support these views. Again, we must point out that appellate courts should not substitute their discretion with that of the trial court or the expert witnesses, save only in instance where the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted by evidence.

We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact that at the time of his marriage to petitioner, he was nearly 29 years old or the fact that the expert testimony has identified a grave clinical or medical cause for his abnormal behavior.

Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfo’s dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36.

Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfo’s condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system since his early years was supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.
At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself in those instances when it is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time and apply them to situations and people in a society in flux. With respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not only developments in science and medicine but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional gender roles. In the case at bar, the spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a cohesive unit based on mutual love, respect and support, due to the failure of one to perform the essential duties of marriage.

In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.

Halili v. Halili G.R. No. 165424 June 6, 2009


FACTS:
Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not "fake." 
ISSUE:                                                                               
Whether or not his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity.
RULINGS:                                                                
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity on a case-to-case basis - guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals. 
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others' comments. 

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. 

It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage and thus the Court declared the marriage null and void. 

Suazo v. Suazo


SUAZO v. SUAZO 

G.R. No.  164493 March 10, 2010

FACTS:
Angelito Suazo  and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only.  Without any means to support themselves, they lived with Angelito’s parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived.  10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks” but the CA reversed it and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified.  The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation.  The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of merit The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. A’s testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations. 
 It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations.  Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.